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It’s a commonplace that privacy can now be abridged and abdicated in
ways that weren’t routinely possible until very recently. I want here to draw
attention to an alternative configuration of the mind that these techniques
make available, which I will call the minimal person.
My explication of minimal personhood is going to take the long way
around. I will have to explain what the ethical and political concept of
privacy has to do with the older and very different philosophers’ notion of
logical privacy: this part of the discussion will connect the recent debates
over extended cognition and first-person authority to one another. To get
into a position where I can do that, I will have to explain how personhood
and the laws of logic are also related topics. And to do that, I will start out
with an exercise in what Paul Grice and, following him, Michael Bratman
have called ‘creature construction.’1
1
Creature-construction arguments proceed by describing a series of progres-
sively more ambitious organisms or robots, each of which handles a perfor-
∗I’m grateful to Chrisoula Andreou and Leslie Francis for comments on an earlier draft,
to Meg Bowman, Michael Gill, Matt Haber, David Humphries, Jenann Ismael, Kimberly
Johnston, Jan Murphy, Shaun Nichols and Dan Russell for helpful conversation, and to
the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at the University of Arizona for work space.
1Grice, 1975; Bratman, 2006, passim and esp. 49f; Millgram, 1997, ch. 5, is a creature-
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2mance shortfall identified in its predecessor; the immediate point of these
descriptions is to isolate the features that support the incremental improve-
ments in performance, and thereby to justify incorporating those features
into the design of an agent faced with a particular range of challenges. After
we have the upcoming creature-construction argument in place, I will return
to the question of how we are supposed to understand their upshots.
I am going to opt for imaginary robots over imaginary organisms, and
the primary dimension along which I am going to arrange my robots is how
much the robotics design team knows about the environments in which they
are intended to operate.2 Accordingly, at the beginning of the series, we
can place the Mark I, which is constructed for a thoroughly understood
and fully predictable environment: perhaps an assembly line on which regu-
larly spaced, identically positioned widgets undergo a mechanically identical
modification. For this task, the sequence of motions of the robot’s arm and
gripper can be hard-coded into silicon, and consequently the Mark I needs
scarcely anything in the way of sensory inputs; it does not, for instance,
need to see the oncoming widgets. And it needs scarcely anything in the
way of a representation of its environment. (‘Scarcely anything’: the de-
signers might want to build in a series of checkpoints, e.g., to verify that
the gripper did close down on the part.) Because robots are thought of as
autonomous (at least to some extent), this is a trivial and limiting case of
an industrial robot.
But of course the Mark I is usable only in an extremely controlled envi-
ronment. If a human being further up the line is putting the half-assembled
widgets onto the conveyor belt any old which way, the Mark I must be
junked, and the factory will upgrade to the Mark II: a substantially more
sophisticated device equipped with a camera, capable of determining the
positioning of a widget, and capable of computing the movements of its
manipulator. The Mark II will construct and update representations of the
positions of the oncoming widgets, of its own effector, and perhaps other
elements of its environment. However, those quite limited representations
will not yet amount to a map—say, of the factory floor. The important
step that has been taken here is that of delegating to the device part of
the control that, in the Mark I, could be exercised directly by the robot’s
designer: only a small part, however, since in this case the designer is able
to anticipate a great deal of what the robot is and is not to do. For instance,
it is normal in robots of this type to manually specify a volume outside of
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3which the robot’s arm may not move.
The design team might decide that it wants a robot, the Mark III, that
can be repositioned at different points in an assembly process. The Mark
III, unlike its predecessors, is able to move around the factory floor, and so
now a map is necessary. Perhaps the team can have the robot load a floor
plan they provide during its initialization procedure, but because equipment
is expected to move, the Mark III will need to update its map; moreover,
because avoiding industrial accidents is a priority, it is a good idea to allow
for updating in real time, on the basis of sensor inputs. (If the robot bumps
into something that its map says is not there, it should be able to overwrite
the map entry.) And because the programmer does not know where the
robot will be at any particular time, he will have to delegate to the robot
still more of the task of determining what it is going to do: now the robot
must compute how it is to execute its tasks, given an initial location, and a
map of the factory floor which it is responsible for updating.
There are many such incremental improvements to be walked through,
at each of which the design team hands off more control to the robot it is
designing. In the interest of brevity, I’m going to skip ahead a few models
to a technique which I’m mentioning primarily because of its familiarity to
philosophers. In one way of controlling the activities of a robot, let’s say it’s
the Mark N, it derives a series of operations to execute via backward chaining
from a specified set of goal states.3 There are a great many philosophers
who seem to think that such means-end derivations are the only form of
problem solving through which the solution to an action control problem
can be computed.4 In fact, programming methods and control techniques
vary, and here we can see this one to be just another step in such a sequence
of designs: the step at which the engineer reserves specification of goals as
his own prerogative, but delegates computation of a sequence of operations
that will attain those goals to the device. The point of doing it this way
is that the robot will be functioning in an environment that the designer
understands well enough to assign objectives to his robot, but does not
understand well enough to be able to specify, ahead of time, how those
objectives are to be achieved.
I want to emphasize that there is nothing special about this stage of
the sequence, and just to make sure the point sticks, let’s also sketch the
Mark N+1, designed for a somewhat more demanding environment, in this
case, a robotics competition with many, many rounds. At each round, the
3SHRDLU was a famous early softbot of this kind. See Winograd, 1972, pp. 117–123.
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4robots are scored by a panel of judges on a number of dimensions—but while
the dimensions are labeled (‘versatility,’ ‘intelligence,’ etc.), the design team
can no longer predict what implementable objectives will guide the robot
successfully through the contest. Their solution is to allow the scoring, at
each stage of the competition, to modify both their robot’s objectives, and
the priority ordering among them. Each objective is given its own ‘bank
account,’ and whenever it is successfully achieved, its account is augmented
by the panel’s score; objectives bid, in a simulated auction, to control the
robot’s behavior during the next stage of the competition; at every round,
some percentage of the objectives mutate. Over the course of the compe-
tition, the robot’s mix of objectives evolves to match the contours of the
judges’ implicit standards.5 Here the design team understands the environ-
ment well enough to identify elements of a behavior-guiding feedback loop,
but not well enough to be able to assign objectives to the robot ahead of
time, and so they delegate to the robot the task of computing its own goals
on the basis of values taken by suitable variables in the loop.
Let’s skip ahead a number of stages, to robots intended for still more
challenging environments (and now we are pushing past the frontiers of
contemporary robotics). The designers will have to delegate the task of
computing goals or objectives to the robot in even less structured environ-
ments than that of the Mark N+1. To make this vivid, let’s imagine that,
just as NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory has been sending Mars Rovers
to a nearby planet to see what’s out there, the space agency on some other
planet is working on a mobile robot that they are going to use to explore
the Earth. Let’s call it the Earth Rover. What should the Earth Rover look
like?
Because the point of such a robot is, precisely, to explore its environment,
its designers know very little about what it’s like where it’s going. So the
Earth Rover cannot come equipped with a map it loads from an initialization
file; instead, it will have to be its own cartographer. It will also have to
develop representations of its environment that don’t function in a map-like
way; for example, when it records that the larger inhabitants of the Earth
seem to be bipeds and quadrupeds, that observation is not associated with
any particular map coordinates. Let’s refer to this class of data as the Earth
Rover’s theory of its surroundings. The task of map and theory construction
is continuous with the activities of earlier robots in our series, but, obviously,
5The approach is adapted from the induction algorithm described at Holland et al.,
1986, pp. 47–50, 116–134, 146–150; one of the more interesting aspects of their technique
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5much more demanding; I will presently consider some of the ways in which
it is harder.
How will the Earth Rover make decisions? The Earth is (from the point
of view of the design team: is likely to be) a patchwork of very varied
landscapes, and a well designed Earth Rover ought to do very different things
in the different landscapes. For instance, if it lands in the Sahara, it should
take soil and rock samples; but if it lands in the rain forest, it should take
foliage samples; and if it lands on the Upper West Side, it should take sushi
samples. Maybe its designers know about rocks, but they don’t know about
rain forests or Manhattan sushi bars ahead of time, and because the robot’s
home planet is so far away from the Earth, the robot cannot be built around
the assumption that it will get timely guidance from its mission control when
it first encounters them. Apparently, such a robot must be able to set its
own objectives, as it develops its map and accompanying theory of where it
has landed.6 But how can the design team equip a robot to make headway
on the parallel mapping and planning problems they are envisaging?
Here is an approach that is a likely and promising part of the architecture
for such a robot. (I am not suggesting that it will suffice on its own.) The
development team already knows that the robot will be constructing a map
6Philosophers too often have entrenched reflexes that need to be turned off before
philosophical headway can be made, and the reflex most salient in this case is insisting on
a high-level objective or end, one which can be set by the programmer and not delegated.
(‘Exploring’ would be a likely proposal, in this case; ‘scoring high’ is a likely suggestion
for the Mark N+1.) But such broad, cover-all-bases objectives do not support backward
chaining: in more traditional philosopher’s jargon, when your end is something on the
order of ‘exploring,’ you’re not yet in a position to find a means to your end; you must
first engage in some form of deliberation of ends. In Aristotle’s version of the problem,
everyone wants a happy, well-lived life—but what is a well-lived life? Before proceeding to
try to live one, you have to do something else: perhaps specify, in a much more concrete
way, what living well (and likewise: exploring, or performing well by the judges’ lights)
comes to—and perhaps also what it comes to in these circumstances. What this entails
is that such ends are formally very different from the goals that do anchor means-end
reasons. As a class, they are not well-understood: we don’t know how to build robots
that act on such ends, and we aren’t able to say clearly how we use them ourselves. (For
an overview of the specificationism literature, see Millgram, 2008.)
In any case, it is a mistake simply to assume that such engineering problems are to be
solved by introducing a high-level or a ‘final’ end as a reference point, as opposed, say,
to constructing feedback loops. E.g., if we define a global variable whose value depends
on how much has just been accomplished in the way of additions or changes to a map; if
we make the ways in which the robot sets itself mapping tasks sensitive to the value of
the global variable; if we do all of that right, we could tell our funding agency that we
were building a robotic model of curiosity: and the robot’s exploration of its environment
would not be, formally, goal- or end-directed. (For some discussion of one such feedback
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6of the environment it is traversing. They know it will developing a theory
to accompany its map. They also know that the robot will maintain data
structures that guide its activities: perhaps task schedules or prioritized lists
of objectives or variables that play designated roles in feedback loops. To
have some shorthand for this, let’s say that the robot is maintaining a field
of representations. At any point in its mission, the Earth Rover will have
available to it an already constructed field of representations.
Now, the design team can be reasonably sure that the Earth Rover’s field
of representations will contain errors: after all, even the best professional
cartographers make mistakes, and who has not found mistakes in his to-do
list? Again, the robot will be far, far away on Planet Earth; its mission
control will be unable to fix those mistakes, and the robot will have to
correct them itself. But those very mistakes can be exploited; in fact, turned
into the fuel on which the robot’s cognitive processing runs. To mine its
mistakes, the design team can give the Earth Rover a set of rules that enforce
informational hygiene on its field of representations. Hygiene violations are
defined to catch what the design team anticipates are likely to be errors in the
evolving field of represenations; for the most part, they trigger one or another
procedure meant to identify and rectify the problem. (But hygiene rules need
not always target such errors directly: for example, the high-payoff hygiene
violations are easier to identify when encoding conventions are uniformly
followed, and so the team might determine inconsistent encoding to be itself
a hygiene violation; we impose this sort of requirement on ourselves, a trivial
example being our insistence on standardized spelling.)
What sort of triggers can the design team anticipate are likely to indicate
mistakes in the map under construction? Perhaps they know enough about
the surface of the Earth to expect that if the robot has visited the same
map coordinates twice, and recorded a different altitude each time, or very
dissimilar imaging, something has gone wrong. (Mostly they will be right,
but not always: maybe the first time around, the Earth Rover has found its
way to the top of an overhanging cliff, and the second time it is at the bot-
tom, under the overhang.) So the robot’s informational hygiene will require
that each point on the map be tagged with no more than one altitude. Ob-
jectives in the task list that are not paired up with plans for accomplishing
them might count as hygiene violations. And—again I’m going to provide
this example primarily because it will be familiar to philosophers—the robot
might have in its theory a pair of representations with the respective forms
‘p’ and ‘∼p’; the design team might also designate that as a hygiene viola-
tion. They’re pretty sure that, when it happens, something has gone wrong,
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7Let’s consider that last example a little further. There are evidently
many responses the Earth Rover design team might provide to such a vio-
lation of representational hygiene. The crudest way of resolving the issue is
to delete one of the conflicting representations at random; but the chances
of guessing right are no better than fifty-fifty, and in any case, this proce-
dure fails to leverage the hygiene violation to correct less obvious errors in
the field of representations. If it is a matter of what the Earth Rover has
marked on its map, the robot could revisit the relevant map coordinates
and take another look: this will involve adding an objective to the task list,
planning a route, and executing the plan. Because such investigations are
expensive, however, the design team might see if the error can be diagnosed
and fixed without spending valuable surveying time. If memory is cheap
enough, the robot can be built to save backups of its representational field,
to try to locate the source of the error in its history, and to revise its current
informational state on the basis of those diagnostics.
In this approach, computing new objectives can be just a special case
of rectifying hygiene violations. For instance, certain kinds of gap in the
robot’s map might be designated as violations. Sometimes the robot will be
permitted to resolve them through interpolation; however, when the data for
the surrounding regions are insufficiently smooth, the Earth Rover can be
required to assign itself a new objective: that of conducting on-site observa-
tions. (When it’s a gap in the theory rather than the map, we philosophers
will call it induction rather than interpolation, and a very sophisticated ver-
sion of such a robot may conduct observations elsewhere, meant to support
better interpolations or inductions.) Again, when there are too many objec-
tives on its task list to be integrated into an executable plan, that may count
as a hygiene violation; one way to resolve it is for the Earth Rover to gen-
erate plans that include different objectives from the list, to rank the plans
using an appropriate coherence metric, and to delete the objectives that are
not included within the most coherent plan. Notice that the most coherent
plan, on some coherence metrics, may be one that adds new objectives to
the list: the most coherent plan that unifies the already available objectives
of surveying region A, and of surveying region C, may also involve surveying
a region, B, between A and C, even though surveying B is not a means to
either prior objective.7 So cleaning up violations of representational hygiene
can amount to doing (anyway some of) what we have already decided the
Earth Rover needs to do: update and recompute its goals.
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82
Creature-construction arguments resemble the more familiar category of
state-of-nature arguments: in both sorts of argument, a streamlined ver-
sion of a familiar phenomenon is exhibited as solving a simplified version
of a pressing problem. The two types of argument differ primarily in that
creature-construction arguments do not require the robots or organisms be-
ing discussed to appreciate the merits of the solution themselves, whereas
state-of-nature arguments turn on the agreement of the population in the
state of nature that the solution is satisfactory. In both sorts of argument,
the point of exhibiting the artificial solution is to elicit a distinctive response,
a recognition that has more or less this form: oh, so that’s why we do it this
way, and that’s a way to see familiar, ordinary so-and-sos! We’ve reached
the point in our own creature-construction argument where I need to invite
that moment of recognition.
We have described an administrative device used to manage the activities
of agents that have to navigate fluid and hard-to-anticipate environments.
The device is constructed by designating a field of representations that is
subject to a set of hygiene constraints, and then by implementing mecha-
nisms that do a sufficiently good job of ensuring ongoing conformity of the
representational field with the hygiene regime. We can now introduce two
technical philosophical terms: persons are those administrative devices. The
logic for a person is the system of informational hygiene constraints govern-
ing the designated field of representations. As we saw, the design solution
involves the delegation of a particular level of responsibility: persons are re-
sponsible for getting their field of representations to conform to their logic.
When it’s people, rather than robots, these assignments of responsibility
have a social dimension; we demand conformity to and sanction deviations
from the hygiene regime.8 And this last claim about how responsibility is
assigned in the design approach we’re now discussing matches our own prac-
tice. If I believe that p, and I believe that ∼p, I am logically inconsistent:
because I am violating the principle of noncontradiction, I am required (or
anyhow, this is the standard view of the matter) to alter my beliefs and
remove the contradiction. However, if I believe that p, and you believe that
∼p, we merely disagree; there is no inconsistency on anyone’s part, and no
requirement on either of our parts to revise our beliefs. Our present way
8Brandom, 1994, ch. 1, provides a philosophically useful caricature of the system of
penalties and demands. I expect that this approach to personhood can account for its
moral and political dimensions as well; however, I will not take on those further tasks
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9of doing things enforces the logical norms only within the boundaries of
a person (or an institution, such as a corporation, that is modeled on a
person).
If we are right to think of a person as this sort of administrative device,
we have to think of logic as an administrative technique as well. Thus, what
persons are and what the laws of logic are turn out to be two problems that
have to be solved jointly. Now, each problem on its own has given rise to
a great deal of the wrong kind of philosophy: I mean, philosophizing that
proceeds by table-thumping and insisting on whatever opinion one happens
to already have.9 But the coexplication of personhood and of logic—the
idea that types of persons and corresponding logics come as packages—
promises to give us much more traction on each of them: given what the
field of representations is going to have to look like, it is reasonable to impose
certain hygienic constraints, and not others; given what constraints need to
be imposed, the field of representations must be demarcated in such and
such a manner.
Two points are best registered before proceeding. First, the view of
logic I am advancing is avowedly psychologistic, by which I mean that logic is
understood to address the question of what the prescriptive rules of inference
and reasoning are, and to do that by considering, among other things, what
the mental activity of reasoning is like. For most of the twentieth century,
accusing a philosopher of psychologism was a bit like accusing someone of
communism during America’s McCarthy era; it has been a long time since
anyone has given level-headed consideration to the merits of psychologism.
Allow me to recommend reviewing the arguments against psychologism, in
both the analytic tradition (Frege) and the continental tradition (Husserl).
You will find that they are fallacy-ridden, and that there were never any
good (or even halfway-decent) arguments against psychologistic philosophy
of logic.10 I mean the present discussion to invite reconsideration of this
long-neglected approach to logic.
Second, if persons are the administrative devices I have just described,
persons are a design solution that will normally be only approximately im-
plemented. Over the coming two sections, I will flag some of the ways in
which actual persons deviate from the streamlined and idealized functional
characterization I have given. For now, bear in mind that no one is likely
9Millgram, 2009b, sec. 7, briefly describes a representative example from mid-twentieth-
century philosophy of logic.
10Kusch, 1995, and Ringer, 1990, pp. 295–298, provide historical and sociological back-
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10
to be more than an approximation to personhood. Persons are idealizations
that are enormously important both for understanding what we are and for
guiding what we do, but which we should not expect to find in nature.
Are we persons, even approximately? (I.e., is this the right idealization?)
We have to get around in a world that is, by turns, familiar and deeply novel;
even once we become familiar with some region or aspect of our environment,
we are often forced to leave it and find our feet in a very different region of
the world. We cannot get by on the goals we grow up with, or find in our
animal repertoire; we have to map out our world, bit by bit, and change
our plans as we see more of the map; when our plans change, our objectives
change with them.
Naval vessels are described using lead ships that are of the same ap-
proximate design, as when we say that Fletcher -class destroyers were used
in the Pacific theater. Adopting this convention, if the terse description of
our capabilities that I gave a moment ago was correct, then we are Earth
Rover-class agents. Earth Rovers can be expected to operate as persons,
and we recognize the administrative procedure in our own activities. I think
it is safe to presume that we are, anyway approximately, persons.
3
I need to pause to speak to an objection that many philosophers are likely
not just to have but to feel very strongly about. I have described the hygiene
rules introduced at the last stage of our creature-construction argument as a
robot’s logic, and I have presented this as a way of understanding our logic:
an informational hygiene regime that can be justified as part of a particular
design solution. But, the objection will run, whatever this is, it isn’t logic.
The hygiene constraints I described were negotiable; the design team might
have settled on other rules than they did for this robot, or on very different
rules for a somewhat different robot; they might decide at some point to
upgrade the robot’s list of constraints. Whereas, the objection continues,
logic is a matter of fact, not something you can decide upon, and it is the
same for everyone. (There cannot be one logic for Earth Rovers, another for
people, and yet another for who knows who else.) The science of logic (what
follows will be a bit of a caricature, but not much of one) is the investigation
of the consequence relation; it is the investigation of the structural features
of a realm of abstract objects; logic is a branch of mathematics. Logic can
be studied, described and understood, but not chosen or altered.
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11
lustration. The principle of noncontradiction was introduced above as an
example of a choice the design team might make. For all I have said, they
might have instead determined that cleaning up contradictions was not likely
to be the best way of getting the robot through the challenges posed by its
environment, and simply left noncontradiction off the list of constraints the
robot is responsible for enforcing on its field of representations. On the view
I am developing, even the law of logic that says that, for any p, ∼(p ∧ ∼p)
is a practical choice, made on the basis of performance considerations.11
On the traditional way of thinking, the bottom line is that both of p
and ∼p cannot be true, and that is all there is to it. But let’s return to our
Earth Rover mapping its environment, which may be the Sahara, or the rain
forests of New Zealand, or Manhattan. If you think about it, it is obvious
that different kinds of environments call for different kinds of maps. If the
robot is on the city streets, it should construct a street map, but if it makes
its way down into the subway system, it should construct a subway map. Its
designers cannot know in advance what sort of map will be called for, and
so, if they can, they will also delegate to the robot the task of determining
what sort of maps to construct. Let’s call the improved version that does
this the Earth Rover Advanced ; we can reserve the name “Earth Rover” for
the simpler version that comes with a fixed set of map conventions.
It should be clear that because different types of maps will differ formally,
different hygiene rules will be appropriate for them. For instance, a street
map represents the distances from one point to another, and so testing for
consistency of those distances with one another is appropriate. A subway
map only needs to be topologically correct, and the distances from one point
on the map to another will be properly determined by layout, readability
and typographical requirements.12 So the Earth Rover Advanced will also
have to compute its own hygiene rules. That is, from the point of view of the
creature-construction argument we are developing, there is no answer to the
question: is logic fixed and unalterable? Rather, the question is how much
responsibility has been delegated to the robot, and how much control is being
reserved by the design team for the operators. At the Earth Rover stage, the
11It may even be a choice that was, in our own case, made incorrectly. In imposing these
sorts of constraints, feasibility is normally a relevant consideration; your robot should be
able to live up to its logic, more or less. Ancient and medieval logicians were unaware that
truth-functional consistency is a computationally intractable problem; it is not a demand
we can live up to, and in real life the constraint is only enforced locally, and never globally.
(For Cook’s Theorem, see Garey and Johnson, 1979, sec. 2.6.)
12Some subway maps try to have it both ways; it’s instructive to compare a current
New York City subway map with the much more usable (and incidentally aesthetically
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12
design team delegates responsibility for constructing and maintaining a field
of representations, while reserving to the programmers the specification of
the constraints the field is required to satisfy; at the subsequent stage, the
design team delegates responsibility for adjusting the constraints governing
the field to the robot as well.13 As before, the motivation in the former case
is that the robot’s designers know enough about the challenges posed by the
robot’s environment to specify its logic, but not enough to anticipate the
concrete results to be obtained by enforcing the logic; in the Advanced case,
the motivation is that they do not know enough about those challenges even
to specify the robot’s logic ahead of time. And so the question for us, as
philosophers of logic, is: when we consider ourselves from the design stance,
how much delegation of control should we take there to be?
In Principia Ethica (1903/1960), G. E. Moore pointed out that ques-
tions like, “It’s pleasant, but is it good?” are always intelligible, in that
they might, in principle, be answered one way or the other: they are, as
he put it, open questions. He concluded that being good could not be,
say, being pleasant (and more generally, that ‘good’ could not name any
natural property); if it were, the question would not be ‘open’. Today,
Moore’s Open Question Argument is remembered by metaethicists as his-
torically important—it kicked off twentieth-century metaethics—and also
regarded as thoroughly confused. It was thoroughly confused, but Moore
had stumbled on an important philosophical tool, one whose proper use he
13Will the robot’s logic be formal? As MacFarlane, 2000, has documented, that question
has been taken to mean at least three different things over its history. But we can say this
much: Constraints that are maximally general, rather than subject-specific, are suitable
for guiding their robot through environments that are expected to contain subject matter
that is unfamiliar to the design team. And constraints that can be applied simply by
checking the forms of the representations, and which do not require judgment calls, are
much easier to monitor, and so much more straightforward to impose. We can expect the
design team for an Earth Rover-class device to specify a formal logic for it, if they at all
can.
Can they? The design team may also anticipate a messy environment, one in which its
robot’s inferences will need to be driven by forced matches: for instance, by descriptions
that are not fully true, but rather true enough. (See Millgram, 2009a, chs. 4–6, for
a step-by-step exposition of this train of thought.) In the vocabulary of our creature-
construction argument, that is to say that the robot must count some configurations of
its field of representations as hygiene violations when they are not strictly ruled out, but
come close enough to being ruled out. It is quite implausible that such a ‘close enough’
can be specified formally: for one thing, it is normally content- and task-sensitive. So a
still more advanced robot, designed for an environment anticipated to be messy, will have
a logic that may have a formal component, but which will in large part not be formal. I
won’t explore this point further here, but we should think of an exclusively formal logic
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13
never understood. If we are right, asking such questions can serve, both in
metaethics and philosophy of logic, as a probe that registers where in the
creature-construction sequence one can find oneself.
That we are able to ask, “It’s pleasant, but is it good?” tells us that we
are not well-modeled by a robot whose designers understood its environment
thoroughly enough to hard-code an evaluation of any particular sensation—
this being Moore’s naive model for pleasure—into the silicon. Instead, the
right design, for creatures that have to cope with environments like our
own, involves delegating the evaluation of sensations (and more generally,
features of the ‘natural’ world) to the agent.14 And if we are unable to
see questions like, “It’s good, but does that give me a reason to do it?” as
sensible, that tells us that the further step to a particular more-ambitious
delegation of control and responsibility was not necessary or feasible for our
as-if designers. If we have these responses to this pair of questions, we are
in a position to see ourselves as a design solution tailored to an environment
fluid enough for the designer to need to delegate the task of evaluating one
sort of item or another to his creation, but sufficiently well-understood for
the designer to specify what the ensuing evaluations are to mean for the
robot’s decision-making. It might be necessary, when a robot has to operate
in a still more fluid environment than that one, for its designer to allow
it to recompute what its reasons are, given a set of evaluations; if we can
see that last question as open, we should proceed on the assumption that
we are better modeled by the robot at that stage of the relevant creature
construction. Let’s call this use of such questions Moore’s Probe.
Return now to philosophy of logic. Philosophers who find it unintelligible
to ask, “It’s a contradiction, but is that a reason to revise my beliefs?”
may think that their intuitions about the principle of noncontradiction are
revealing to them a matter of fact belonging to a mind-independent science
of logic. What they are really doing is locating themselves in the creature-
construction sequence: they are identifying themselves as Earth-Rover-class,
as opposed to Earth-Rover-Advanced-class agents.15 The responses elicited
by Moore’s Probe are valuable, but not as limning a consequence relation to
be found in a realm of Platonic entities; instead, they help us identify our
own capacities and limitations.
14Why the scare quotes? Just try to get a philosopher to explain to you what he means
by “natural”.
15Philosophers whose use of Moore’s Probe returns this result sometimes get huffy at the
suggestion that there is another alternative, and here is a typical instance: “no attempt will
be made to argue with those who think it acceptable to contradict oneself” (Williamson,
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If you look at a directory listing on your computer, you will notice toggles on
each file or subdirectory for read, write and execute privileges. The Earth
Rover follows an administrative procedure which enforces informational hy-
giene constraints on a field of representations. How will the design team set
the privileges on the items in that field?
The Earth Rover is assuming responsibility for correcting violations of
the hygiene regime. It cannot do that unless it can identify violations. And
it cannot identify violations unless it can check whether the entries in the
field conform to the constraints. So the designers will assign it read privileges
to the field of representations it is responsible for maintaining; that’s just
part and parcel of the implementation of this administrative device.
That the robot just knows—via what is likely a primitive but in any
case a low-cost, routine and highly reliable operation—what the entries in
its field of representations are is an implementation requirement: one way
or another, the design team has to make sure this is a feature of their
device. The philosophers’ labels for this requirement being met are ‘first-
person authority,’ and, more recently, ‘self-knowledge’; that you just know
what you think, in that very special way that others do not, is treated as a
remarkable feature of the mind, and usually taken to require a very special
sort of explanation, in the style of old-school metaphysics. Accordingly,
a philosophical subspecialization has emerged whose members compete to
provide such explanations. Just for instance, according to some of them, you
have what might as well be a camera inside your head that tells you what
you think. Again for instance, according to others, your pronouncements
about what you think are to be construed as analogous to cries of pain, and
are not properly reports at all.16 But we can now see that it scarcely matters
16For sample ‘detectivist’ views, see Armstrong and Malcolm, 1984, pp. 108–137, Nichols
and Stich, 2003, ch. 4. The label is due to Finkelstein, 2003, which is itself one of several
developments of expressivism. Unsurprisingly, we also find denials that there is any such
feature of the mind to be explained; Carruthers, 2011, is an example.
Sydney Shoemaker has devoted a substantial part of his efforts over an academic career
to accounting for first-person authority. (See especially Shoemaker, 1996, but also Shoe-
maker, 1963, ch. 6.) With a handful of exceptions, the arguments fall into two groups:
those that show that when an agent falls short of self-knowledge, its rationality will be
impaired, and those that show how a rational agent can exercise first-person authority
even when it cannot do the job by directly retrieving items stored in memory. I have
found these very helpful in thinking about the functionality of an Earth Rover.
From the point of view of the design analysis we are developing, arguments in the first
group show why first-person authority is an implementation constraint on Earth Rover-
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how the implementation requirement is satisfied, as long as it is satisfied.
And unless we imagine our robot’s design team to be obsessed with elegant
engineering, we can expect it to be satisfied in a number of different ways:
there should be no one such explanation for first-person authority. The
appearance of an occasion for old-school metaphysics very often arises from
confusing a demand with a fact ; for philosophical purposes, all that matters
here is to explain the demand.
That the Earth Rover has write privileges for its representational field is
also an implementation requirement. The Earth Rover is assuming respon-
sibility for correcting violations of the hygiene regime. It cannot do that
unless it can remove violations. And that entails either deleting, overwrit-
ing, or adding representations. A largish proportion of the recent discussion
of self-knowledge turns on the observation that you can know what you
think by making up your mind about it.17 This describes a side-effect of
what is, once again, not a fact but a requirement: the Earth Rover has to
be able to write out changes to its data; if it cannot revise entries in its field
of representations, it cannot maintain its hygiene regime.
not need to be implemented across the board as hard-coded memory access operations.
However, that latter group of arguments do have to be taken with a grain of salt. Some
of the proposed workarounds impose high computational overhead (because they depend
on the agent running through overly involved trains of ratiocination). When the overhead
is too high, these will be poor or even unworkable implementation choices.
17Among such ‘constitutivist’ views, McGeer, 1996, argues that you know what you
think because, once you have decided and announced what you think, you can live up
to your announcement, by ensuring that your subsequent behavior conforms to it. (See
also McGeer, 2007, and, for a related view, Bilgrami, 2006.) Moran, 2001, argues that
you know what you think because, whenever the question arises, you can reconsider your
opinion about the topic at hand, on its merits. The accounts are very close indeed,
but we can distinguish them this way: Moran is focused on upstream inputs to your
decision, and McGeer on downstream followons. The question of philosophical interest is
raised indirectly by Lawlor, 2003, which points out that they do sometimes come apart:
you make up your mind, but don’t follow through. So what brings it about that the
phenomena of interest to McGeer and Moran so often travel together? How is it that once
we have made up our minds what we think, we frequently follow through, and live up to
what we have said we think? How is it that when we follow through, it is often because
we have made up our minds? In my view, this is best addressed as an implementation
issue, via the sort of creature-construction argument we are now developing.
Moran seems to take his ‘transparency’ view to compete with detectivism, but this is
evidently an error. If you find out what you think about some question by reconsidering
it, the bases for your reconsideration—without loss of generality, we can take these to be
the premises of an argument—are either available to you in the very same way, or in some
different way. There is only so much reconsideration you can afford on any occasion, and
no amount of it will staunch the regress. So sometimes you must know what you think,
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The requirement that the Earth Rover coordinate its representations as
specified by the hygiene constraints will not normally be met if other parties
are also able to modify representations within the field. (E.g., if the robot
tries to eliminate the conflict between representations with the forms p, ∼p
by overwriting the p-representation with a q, that will not ensure conformity
with the hygiene constraints if, at the same time, another party is likely to
be busily adding representations to the field that perhaps conflict with the q-
representation.18) If you look once again at the long directory listing on your
computer, you will see that it allows the access toggles to be flipped different
ways for different users: for instance, a file might marked as readable and
writable by the system administrator, as entirely off-limits to another group
of users, and as read-only for you. We can anticipate the design team will
enable write privileges (and, if the robot is going to be operating in a hostile
environment, read privileges) for the robot alone.19
Persons, evidently, are private, and because I will presently introduce a
related but contrasting administrative device, let’s call instances of the tra-
ditional design solution private persons. Because human beings who imple-
ment such a design solution will end up shaping their intellectual apparatus
around its features, truisms like, ‘Only you can make up your own mind,’
and ‘Only you can think your own thoughts’ will end up conceptual truths,
and will seem to invite superlative explanations. They do not. Logical
privacy is a side effect of adopting efficient descriptive conventions against
the background of the stably implemented administrative device of private
persons: that is, against the background of a good deal of de facto privacy.
Third, recall that the Earth Rover will sometimes resolve violations of
its hygiene regime by developing and executing a plan for revisiting a site
about which it seems to possess contradictory information; more generally,
sometimes its method for correcting violations involves adding new objec-
tives to its task list and taking action. There is no point in having the robot
write subroutines for itself unless it can run them; accordingly, it is also
part and parcel of the design solution that the Earth Rover have execute
privileges to its representational field. But the Earth Rover will not be able
to complete the tasks it sets for itself if other parties are able to interfere
with its activities by running their own programs on it, and so the design
solution will also reserve execute privileges solely to the robot.
We can now turn to making a distinction and adding a needed qualifi-
18That said, there may be other workable approaches. Wikipedia is much more consis-
tent than the rationale I have just given would lead you to expect.
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cation. I introduced persons as zones of logical responsibility, and I pointed
out that read-write-execute privileges are necessary if the administrative
device is to be effective. However, it is important to acknowledge that we
are not merely persons: we do engage in the administrative activities I have
been describing, but this is not everything we do, nor everything we are. For
instance, your muscles are not elements of your field of representations, but
they are nonetheless part of you. And the Earth Rover’s computational en-
gine may process a great many representations on which it does not enforce
the sort of hygiene rules I have been describing. Let’s call the computa-
tional activities of the Earth Rover cognition, and the representations that
belong to the field on which it enforces its hygiene constraints its mental
states—collectively, its mind. Mental states are, in this usage, a subclass of
cognitive states; we should not expect the Earth Rover to have across-the-
board read-write-execute access to all of its cognitive states. After all, we
have no reason to think that, from the point of view of the design team, it
needs those across-the-board privileges.
Let’s explore this distinction. First, consider whether we should think of
perceptions as mental or merely cognitive states. If they are mental states,
they might seem to be an objection to the account I have been developing;
we cannot change what we see and feel in the way that we can change our
mind about other things, which is to say that we do not seem to have write
privileges to our sensations. Now, that observation has to be complicated a
bit, because we are told that the computational states that implement our
sensations are in fact undergoing constant revision. What matters for our
purposes is that the revision is not transparent to us, we do not control it,
and we are accordingly not held responsible for it—anyway in the way we
are held responsible for logical inconsistency. We can model perceptions as
subject to an asymmetrical informational hygiene rule: the Earth Rover is
required to rectify mismatches between its perceptions and elements of the
field of representations we have already described, but not by altering the
perceptions to match other data in the field. As before, this is reflected
in our own practice: expectation may determine perception, as the catch-
phrase has it, but we are not held responsible for adjusting our perceptions
to our expectations, and we do not merit labels like ‘inconsistent’ and ‘ir-
rational’ when we fail to do so—on the contrary.20 I mentioned earlier that
20In fact, the situation is trickier than that. Although Dennett, 1991, is now considered
somewhat dated, it is deserving of continued attention for developing a series of arguments
whose conclusions, however, the author seems to have misinterpreted. These arguments
establish that a perceptual experience consists of a constantly updated stream of represen-
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we are best thought of as approximations to the administrative idealization
of personhood; now that we have noted that perceptions are only partially
covered by the sort of hygiene regime I was describing, we can choose to
classify perceptions as cognitive rather than mental states, or to describe
the way we handle sensory inputs as one way in which we are messier than
the clean administrative device I was using as a model.
Memories are also liable to strike philosophers as another potential coun-
terexample: a class of mental states for which we have read privileges but
not write privileges.21 We are not supposed to change what we remember
when it proves to be inconsistent with what we believe on other grounds,
and as with perception, we can accommodate this in either of two ways.
We can classify memories as cognitive states rather than full-fledged mental
states, or we can register that the highly simplified, idealized model that we
arrived at in our creature construction abstracts away from much that goes
to make up actual human beings: by acknowledging, that is, that we are
only approximately persons.
However, as with perception, the facts on the ground are more compli-
cated. We regularly replace our memories with synopses, and those synopses
with synopses of them. . . and there is evidently a creature-construction ex-
planation for that fact. Tersely: recall the suggestion that memories are
added to a robot initially to support debugging; when a violation of the
informational hygiene regime is identified, it will often be cheaper to look at
the backtrace to find the source of the error than to revisit the sites of earlier
observations. (No doubt memories will have other uses as well.) Now, even
if memory is inexpensive, searching it is not. To keep the ever-increasing
bulk of records usable, it will have to be continually redigested into short,
simpler and easier-to-navigate versions; and it may be reasonable to do so
on the assumption that, roughly, the further back in the past the event is,
the less it matters to be able to retrieve details. The upshot will be a robot,
the Mark M, whose memories are being revised on a regular basis, but—
and this is what allows us to classify them as cognitive rather than mental
of the central field of representations in a robot of the Earth Rover’s design. That is, no
item in the stream counts, for purposes of the hygiene regime, as the final, designated sen-
sation which other representations are required to match. Accordingly, the requirements
of fit between sensory inputs and the designated field of representations in minds such as
our own are much harder to formulate, in that the sensory inputs are moving targets.
21Perception and memory are not the only such states. Let’s suppose that a member of
the Catholic church is supposed to believe what the Pope believes on matters of doctrine.
The member will not be able to resolve hygiene violations by changing the Pope’s mind,
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states—these revisions are not subsumed under the set of responsibilites for
maintaining the robot’s field of representations, as I described it above.22
5
Now that we know what persons are, I want to speak briefly to a recent
debate over their borders at a time. The argument has to do with whether
minds can be ‘extended’—that is, with whether or not all of your thinking
goes on inside your head. The alternative is that some of what is properly
your own mental or cognitive activity might take place in intellectual pros-
theses such as calculators or datebooks, or even in nonartifactual parts of
your environment.23 I am unhappy with the state of the discussion, but I
will do the very minimium in the way of straightening up needed to get to
the next stage of our own argument.
First, in this debate, the participants treat the phrases ‘extended mind’
and ‘extended cognition’ as equivalent—although some of them lean heavily
on the more scientific sound of ‘cognition’.24 Recall, however, that we have
distinguished these terms: your mental states are subject to a hygiene regime
which you are responsible for enforcing; cognitive states are representational
states that may or may not be subject to those hygiene rules. Second, the
participants take themselves to be arguing over a question of fact: whether
there are (or might be) mental or cognitive states outside people’s heads.
Taking the existence (or possibility) of cognitive states outside the head to be
a question of fact is a mistake, but not one that concerns us here.25 However,
22Philosophers worry about personal identity—about what makes you the same person
you were yesterday—and you may expect the addition of an archive to the Earth Rover
to be an entry point into a theory of what it is for Earth Rovers to persist over time. I
think that a creature-construction approach to diachronic personal identity is promising,
but this is not the place to try it out.
23For a recent exposition and defense of the position, see Clark, 2010.
24In somewhat the same vein, you find the latinate ‘intracranial’ replacing the ordinary
English ‘in the head’.
25“Cognitive science” was used as a rallying point for a research program derived from
a defunct philosophical theory of mind, Hilary Putnam’s functionalism (1975). Most of
the argument about extended cognition, which I’m trying to sidestep, arises from a deep
problem with that view. The idea at the center of the research program is to treat minds
as computational systems; the problem is that computation is a purely formal notion. So
where one draws the line around the physical region that is being represented compu-
tationally is left entirely to the discretion of whoever is constructing the computational
representation. It is a question of notation and convenience, not of fact. So when Clark
and Chalmers, 1998, announced that cognition could be extended, they were not making
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it should be clear at this point that what count as a person’s mental states
is a design choice: in our own case, it is something that, subject to feasibility
constraints, we can legislate.
Nowadays, most people carry wirelessly networked computers with them,
pretty much at all times. (They think of these computers as telephones.)
They store a great deal of information on those devices, and they do not,
at least yet, censor the flow of information between their brains and their
phones. As things stand, if there is a representation of the form p ‘in your
head,’ and a representation of the form ∼p on your phone, you may be
likely to miss an appointment, but you are not thereby inconsistent. We
could change that, by requiring you to enforce the hygiene rules not only
on what is now your mind, but on the information stored on your mobile
telephone as well; we could mandate that a violation of the extended hygiene
regime renders you criticizable as inconsistent and irrational. And if we did
that, your phone’s memory, or part of it, would count as part of the field
of representations for which you are responsible: it would be part of your
extended mind. However, I do not find it profitable or instructive to argue
over whether to make this change, anyhow on its own.
(Briefly, for those to whom this is an unfamiliar observation: Any physical object can be
represented as a Turing machine—in fact, can be represented as implementing any Turing
machine—and here’s a trivial example to give you the idea. Let the state of your body
this minute be a simple Turing machine’s initial state, and let the state of your body the
subsequent minute be the machine’s halt state. Let the surface of your body this minute
be one of two symbols from the machine’s alphabet, and let the surface of your body the
next minute be the other symbol. Set the transition function of the machine to map the
initial state and the first symbol onto the halt state and the second symbol. Presto: for
two minutes, you’re a Turing machine!)
Recent attempts to resist the thesis of extended cognition have appealed to the practice
of cognitive science (e.g., Adams and Aizawa, 2008, Rupert, 2009). But you shouldn’t take
the possibility of extended cognition to be settled by appeal to what cognitive scientists
happen to do these days, when they’re figuring out human or animal cognition. The
leading idea of the program, again, is that cognition is computation, but computers are
devices, and computation is an artifactual category. Devices are items we can alter and
improve; you can no more argue that extended cognition isn’t really cognition, because
it looks different than what cognitive scientists have been looking at so far, than you
could have reasonably argued in 1975 that cars can’t come with fuel injection, because
‘automotive science’ had to that point proceeded on the methodological assumption that

















anuscript          




Here, on the other hand, is a modification to the administrative device we
have been discussing that it is now realistically possible to implement, and
which I will try to convince you is of philosophical and practical interest.
In human beings, the read privileges to the contents of someone’s brain
are restricted to that someone, and there’s a feasibility consideration that
dictates doing it this way: we do not know how to support read privileges for
third parties. But third parties (these days, primarily corporations such as
Google and Facebook and Symantec) can access the contents of a networked
portable computer, such as a mobile telephone, or of cloud storage, in real
time. Not only can a third party search for violations of specified hygiene
rules, it can correct them. We already do rely on this way of handling errors
in trivial cases; when a driver is following turn-by-turn directions, and he
misses a turn, the navigation device recalculates the route and gives cor-
rected directions on its own. It is not hard to imagine progressively more
ambitious forms of outsourced hygiene control. Starting very close to where
we are now: when the device determines that there is too much traffic for
the two of you to meet at the restaurant you had planned, the scheduling
application negotiates a different restaurant with your lunch date’s schedul-
ing application, makes reservations, gives you the appropriate turn-by-turn
directions, and both of you find yourselves getting out of your cars, not
where you had originally agreed, but in time for lunch. However, if some-
thing goes wrong, although this sort of delegation may provide you with
an excuse (‘there was a glitch in the scheduling software’), today the re-
sponsibility for getting things right (say, for turning up at the right place
and time) ultimately rests with you. If you do not actually turn up, you
apologize, where that consists in acknowledging that you are at fault.
That could change. Consider the following reassignment of responsibility
for informational hygiene. You (but I will qualify the use of that pronoun
in just a moment) are responsible for enforcing informational hygiene re-
quirements over a brain-based field of representations. You are responsible
for enforcing the coordination of the brain-based field with a specified field
of representations on your mobile telephone; that is, you are responsible
for making sure their contents match. But the responsibility for enforcing
informational hygiene requirements on the networked device is outsourced
to third parties. (For instance, if what you think you are doing today and
what the phone-based schedule says differ, you are thereby inconsistent, and
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In this way of assigning responsibility, when the error was one the third
party was supposed to correct, and you seem to apologize for not turning
up on time, ‘I’m sorry’ no longer acknowledges that you are at fault; your
excuse is no longer an attempt to mitigate blame. Rather, saying that you
are sorry merely expresses polite sympathy, in something like the way that
an administrator says that he is sorry when it turns out that accounting has
not cleared your paycheck: he is acknowledging that it is unfortunate, but
what accounting does or doesn’t do is just not his responsibility.
Persons are administrative devices. Private persons are the traditional
version of this device, in which a single central field of representations is
demarcated by coextensive read, write and execute privileges; these sup-
port the allocation of responsibility for enforcing representational hygiene
to a single locus. The alternative allocation of responsibility we have just
described is no longer a private person (and because ‘private persons’ was
our label for the only model of personhood we have had, the alternative no
longer counts by traditional lights as a person at all). For reasons I will get
to momentarily, let’s call the alternative the minimal person.
When I was describing the alternative assignment of hygienic responsi-
bilities, I promised to qualify my use of “you”. Recall that people structure
their collective intellectual apparatus around features of their lives that they
come to take for granted: pronouns like ‘I,’ ‘you,’ ‘he,’ and ‘she’ have built
into them the presupposition that a person—a traditional, private person—
is being picked out. If minimal persons come to replace private persons, we
will have to adjust our intellectual apparatus, and not just our conceptual
and analytic truths, but our pronouns, to accommodate the new state of
affairs.26 In order to avoid awkward circumlocutions, and the even more
awkward attempt to introduce terminology suited to arrangements that are
not yet in place, I stuck with the current but not-fully-appropriate pronouns.
You can imagine scare quotes around them as you make the necessary ad-
justments.
Minimal personhood requires restricting logical privacy, which in turn re-
quires surrendering a good deal of old-fashioned privacy. Mechanical telepa-
thy is an available off-the-shelf feature for mechanical computers, but not
for brains. Consequently, the person, reconfigured as I have described, is
minimal in virtue of being extended; minimality is not a matter of how
large or small the fields of representations being adminstered are, but of
26The general point is nicely made by Rovane, 1990; she is contemplating a society in
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whether there is an administrative monopoly.
Sometimes a one-person business becomes a large, publicly-owed firm;
once upon a time, a city built on seven hills became a Mediterranean empire.
It would be a mistake to think that the founder and CEO is (really!) the
firm, in something like the way it was a mistake when the Roman Empire
was taken to be really the city of Rome. And it would be roughly that
mistake to observe the human being at the center of the minimal person, to
observe that he still retains administrative responsibility for his brain-based
representations, and to conclude that the human being is (really, still) the
person. The human being has become a component, albeit an essential one,
of a more complex administrative device, and that is reflected in his hygienic
responsibilities: because the brain-based representations violate the hygiene
regime when they do not match the computer-based representations, third
parties can make up the minimal person’s mind—can come to believe—on
his behalf.
7
Minimal persons are to private persons as the libertarians’ minimal state
is to the swiss-army-knife state we inhabitants of the developed world have
become used to living in. In the libertarian utopia, a pared back organiza-
tional core is retained in order to enforce the drastically pared back rules of
the game, and to prevent armed invasion; other functions, even those that
have come to be regarded as standard responsibilities of government, are
outsourced or simply left to take care of themselves. A libertarian minimal
state might outsource peripheral military functions to contractors, privatize
the post office, or eliminate government food safety inspections in favor of
private quality assurance. In the minimal person, the outsourced responsi-
bilities differ, but the arrangement is structually similar: the brain and the
body it is in play the role of an organizing anchor for an extended region
of personal sovereignty, in which the exercise of responsibilities formerly
assigned to persons is turned over to external agencies.27
How should we think about the suddenly possible future in which private
persons have been supplanted by minimal persons? That is, since private
27The large-scale social organization composed of minimal persons is evidently a novel
form of feudalism, one in which vassalage penetrates the boundaries of the person. Plato
thought that the form of justice was the same in the polis and the individual, and he took
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persons are what we have meant so far in talking of persons, how should we
think of a world without persons?
As we take up this question, we need to remain aware of the obstacles
to addressing it intelligently. First, as recent history teaches us, it is hard
to tell what the uptake of a technical innovation is going to look like in real
life.28 We should assume that the picture we have to work with is wrong
in all of its details.29 Second, it is hard for us persons to see the choice
between private and minimal personhood as one that we can make, and so,
as a choice at all.30 And third, the track record suggests that the collective
choice will not be made for the reasons we philosophers are likely to see as
the right ones. Think of what we might call Google panopticism, the startling
emergence of new norms of privacy.31 In the new way of doing things, the
28For instance, in the mid-1960s, it was clear that networked computers were on the
way; Abbate, 1999, recounts how the internet arose out of a series of mistaken expert
judgments as to what users would do with the connectivity: email, amazingly in retrospect,
was believed to be an unimportant application. The ARPAnet became the kernel of
the internet as we now have it because its architecture was flexible enough to support
functionality unintended by its designers.
29And we should not assume that the picture we are considering is the future, details to
one side. One alternative possibility is that the emerging technologies will reinforce rather
than undermine the private person. As it is, the responsibilities we assign to persons are
only sporadically enforced; we honor them to a great extent in the breach, and when we
do live up to them, it is often enough from habit, rather than because we will be called
on it if we do not. But social networking sites make the record of one’s commitments
public, and may over the long term make it very hard to walk away from them. Perhaps
we have never really been persons, or even close approximations to them, and perhaps we
will finally be forced to become the traditional, private persons that we imagined we were.
(For this last suggestion, I’m grateful to Aubrey Spivey; Vogler, 1998, suggests that, if
this happens, we will not like it one bit.)
30Nussbaum, 2001, highlights the perplexities of a formally similar choice considered by
Plato.
31The phrase is adapted from Michel Foucault’s adaptation of Jeremy Bentham’s name
for a prison he planned but never built. In Bentham’s panopticon, the interiors of all
cells would be visible from a central observation post. Foucauldian panopticism is an
institutional rather than architectural innovation: in former times, punishments were
draconian, but laws were sparse; in many modern institutions, rules cover even small
details of behavior, violations incur relatively minor punishments, and checkpoints are
frequent. Foucault discusses prisons, insane asylums, hospitals and so on (Foucault, 1995,
Foucault, 1988, Foucault, 1975), but for an academic audience, universities are probably
the most helpful example. Students turn in homework assignments, are quizzed on the
reading, graded on their classroom discussion and so on. All of those grades are entered
into a spreadsheet, and eventually merged into a grade that is sent to the registrar and
compiled into a transcript, used to determine the student’s honors status, his eligibility
for privileges and so on.
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details of individuals’ lives are monitored and recorded with an exacting
thoroughness formerly reserved for celebrities and spies—but the records
are anonymized before use. Google panopticism was accepted by the public
largely because it was the price of a free, high-performance search engine,
of the minor convenience of being able to pay with a bank card, and of
satisfying the yearning, appropriate to high school but not thereafter, to be
seen to be a member of a popular clique.32 If we become minimal persons,
it will probably be for equally bad reasons.
Nonetheless, we can consider the merits of such a move. Here I will
restrict myself to one type of payoff. Informational and representational
hygiene regimes in Earth Rover-class agents must be selected in view of fea-
sibility constraints; one does not solve a problem by delegating a task to a
device that it is unable to perform. Human beings are quite limited in their
native abilities, and these limitations no doubt go a good deal of the way
towards explaining what those hygiene requirements have been. Kantians
like to think that our intentions are allowable only if they can be certified
by the so-called CI-procedure, which they think of as a test of practical
consistency; the most obvious reason that we do not in fact impose the re-
quirement is that in most cases we are unable to say what would happen if,
as lay people put it, everybody did that.33 Bayesian epistemologists like the
idea of having ‘credences,’ that is, of assigning probabilities to propositions,
rather than believing them outright; they want us to ensure that our prob-
ability assignments are consistent, and they want us to update them on the
basis of Bayes’ Theorem. The most obvious reason that we do not in fact
force these demands on people is that no one could actually live up to them.
Lewisians believe that we should understand our conversations to involve a
shared but invisible scoreboard; the semantics of our utterances are shaped
by the constantly changing score.34 We do engage in this sort of conversa-
dents feel that way, but in fact the reach of the technique is limited by its administrative
overhead. Someone has to update all those entries in the file; if anything is going to be
done on the basis of that file, someone has to do it. And every institution has personnel
shortages.
The remarkable innovation of Google panopticism is that monitoring and followup no
longer require human intervention. Many very small decisions, each tailored to the details
of an individual’s track record, can be taken without spending the time of a human
administrator.
32Was it accepted? (That is, did the public understand the bargain they were making?)
That’s suddenly become a politicized question, but I can vouch for the sophisticates—I
mean, computer scientists, programmers and electrical engineers, who did understand the
bargain—having gone along with it in just this way.
33For a more precise rendering of the CI-procedure, see Millgram, 2005, pp. 90f, 141f.
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tional practice on occasion, but we are not prudent to do so when anything
important is at stake. Because we cannot keep track of the scoreboards we
cannot see, conversation partners cannot verify that they understand the
course of the conversation the same way; when the back-and-forth is not
just friendly patter, conversational scorekeeping is a discourse management
method beloved of shysters.35 The most obvious reason we do not in fact
require Lewis-style conversational scorekeeping is that we just can’t do it
properly.
However, if third-party contractors can perform monitoring and correc-
tion that unassisted humans could not, we are in a position to consider
imposing more ambitious hygiene regimes. I have mentioned that we are
not very good at anticipating the uses that will be made of technological
opportunities, and so I won’t try to say what I think those will be.36 In-
stead, by way of conveying a sense of what such changes might look like, let
me gesture first at a recently imposed hygiene regime of this generic type
that is familiar; after that, I will rehearse Bernard Williams’s description of
another much older shift in administrative requirements.
We could require that all information kept on your personal computer be
associated with some node of a singly-linked graph, and also that each node
in the graph bear a mnemonic label. That is just the organization of data
in a directory tree; rather than leaving compliance up to users, it has long
been enforced by their devices’ operating systems. Very recently, much of
that task has been assumed by applications and rendered invisible to users,
who often do not know how their files are organized. Demands of the kind
I am envisioning might well have this look and feel to their users, but need
not be restricted to the superficial organization of information.
As a illustration of just how deep such changes to our collective hygiene
regime can go, I am going to borrow Williams’s account of how what we
might as well call the logic of time underwent a dramatic revision between
Herodotus and Thucydides.37 Before the transition, one could make claims
a vagueness parameter; if I say something that’s pretty vague, that parameter resets to a
value in the ‘pretty vague’ range, which in turn determines how a subsequent utterance,
by me or by my conversation partner, is assessed: the subsequent utterance comes out
true if it’s true when it’s also understood to be pretty vague.
35Millgram, 2009a, sec. 7.7, explains why; for now, when your cognitive capacities are
swamped by the demands of a task, predatory interlocutors are bound to take advantage
of that fact, and of you if they succeed.
36You might expect that I’m looking forward to the day when Google will check our
credences for Bayesian consistency, but that seems to me to be unlikely: Bayesian updating
is also a computationally intractable problem; see Cooper, 1990.
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about past events without committing oneself to there being a determinate
amount of time that had elapsed between the past event and the present:
when you said that once upon a time, Minos ruled the waves, you had not
yet said anything that entailed that there existed a n such that, n years
ago, Minos ruled the waves. (Yes, there was a time when he did, but no
particular time.) Because the way of thinking is so alien to contemporary
sensibilities, it is worth emphasizing that what Williams is exhuming is not
the thought that you might not know how long ago a past event happened;
we have that thought. It is, rather, a logic of time less demanding than our
own.
By the time we reach Thucydides, we are on familiar conceptual ground.
To say that there was no time in particular at which an allegedly past event
happened meant that it had not really happened at all. “Once upon a
time” came to mean that it happened, not in the past, but in a fairy tale,
and Williams nicely recovers the sense of bewildered outrage on the part of
an older generation unable to fathom why the youth were so dismissive of
what were suddenly merely ‘myths’.
Now notice that this change would not have had much in the way of a
practical point (and probably would not even have been feasible) if not for
devices like calendars, that is, devices that allow one to record and calculate
with temporal location. (If that sounds too hifalutin: calendars allow you
to keep track of and to count the days between events.) When such devices
become routinely available (and I want to stress the ‘routinely’), what we
can think of as the countback requirement for claims about the past became
a social option.
That last example was meant to remind you that these hygiene rules are
our logic. No doubt there are costs to surrendering much of our privacy—
both what ordinary people have meant by that term, and the logical privacy
of interest to philosophers—but I will not consider them here. What we
stand to gain is the opportunity to reconsider what the laws of logic are,
to ratchet up their demands, and so—if those demands are well-chosen—
to equip ourselves, or rather, our minimal successors, to cope with more
challenging environments than our own.
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